

Computer Security Technology

#### PKI and DCE Within ASCI

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
Computer Security Technology

# A Comparison of DCE and PKI Technologies

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
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### DCE Security Interactions





#### PKI Security Interactions





#### PKI Advantages

- Decentralized key storage no single repository of secret or private keys
- Supports NTK discretionary access control model
  - S PK encrypted data not susceptible to unauthorized access by privileged administrators
  - In production today for Entrust encrypted e-mail
  - Might be possible using current technology for NTK protection of web objects (with Netscape plug-in for Entrust)



- n Smart-card compatibility
  - Many vendor supported systems available that secure the private key on smart card
  - 5 Two factor authentication ("something you have + something you know")
  - S Confiscation of hardware assures revokation of NTK access rights.
  - Sut Smartcard hardware is evolving rapidly
  - S PKCS11 helps, (not clear that PKCS11 spec is sufficient for plug-compatibility between different hardware choices.)



- Non-repudiation Features
  - Authentication records or access records involving digitally signed forms can't be tampered with. You can take them to court.
  - Sextremely strong non-repudiation when keys are isolated to PIN protected hardware tokens.
- n But -- Most real world systems require at least a daily CRL lookup from a trusted central service.



- n The likely de-facto standard for HTTP authentication is PKI and SSL3 (TLS)
  - Basis for Netscape's single web sign-on strategy
  - Supported today using Netscape and Entrust
  - Currently the only choice other than Basic Authentication that will be supported by both Netscape and Microsoft web servers and browsers.
  - Will support "informed signing" of HTML form data submitted to a server.



- n Is the current standard for SSL server authentication and signed HTML executable content (Java, active X, javascript)
  - \$ 22,000 Verisign SSL server certificates in existence
- n Could support Bill Johnston's "Use-Condition" Security Architecture at LBL
  - 5 Highly flexible authorization based on a mapping of attributes in PKI capability certificates to useconditions imposed by resource owner
  - verifiably secure
  - In proof-of-concept stage today (see http://www-itq.lbl.gov/~johnston)



#### PKI Disadvantages

- n No standard for PKI authorization
  - industry standards and DOE requirements still evolving
- n Immature
  - few vendors
  - first products for authorization just now appearing
  - few examples of large-scale deployment
- n Difficult and costly to deploy to desktops
- n Cross-certification not yet blessed by SecureNet (for classified applications)



#### DCE Advantages

- n Based on standard code base available to OS vendors from a single source
- n Based on mature authentication service (Kerberos)
- n Designed for heterogeneous environments
  - works on UNIX, Windows 95, Windows NT, Mac
- n Scalable and replicable security services
- n Standard ACL mechanism for authorization



#### DCE Advantages (cont.)

- n Standard authorization mechanism
  - integrates with OS logon
  - familiar ACL paradigm (NTFS, DFS)
  - integrates with web object authorization systems
- n Accreditation of DCE cross-cell authentication in process (nearing completion)



#### DCE Disadvantages

- n Not widely deployed
- n No standard mechanism for Smartcards
- n Lacks non-repudiation feature

## PKI Authentication with DCE Credentials



- n Use PKI to get initial DCE credentials
- n Existing vendor implementations
  - Gradient modified security service to trust certificates
  - Snareworks and IBM Global Sign-on store encrypted DCE keys in their security servers
- n PKI support is priority for next version of DCE
  - s will replace users secret keys with public/private key pairs for initial user authentication
- n Integrates cleanly with existing DCE applications



#### **Conclusions**

- n DCE works now and provides convenient authorization mechanisms via ACLs and groups
- n PKI is new, immature and developing rapidly
- n PKI authentication with DCE offers some advantages in security and manageability
- Need to watch PKI technology, but it's a bit early to jump into full-scale deployment

#### How Does DCE Authorization Work?



- n User logs in to DCE
  - user enters DCE password
  - obtains Kerberos ticket establishing his identity
  - obtains DCE Privilege Authorization Certificate (PAC) establishing group memberships
  - DCE credentials are encrypted via secret key unknown to the user but known to application server
- n User accesses an object (e.g., DFS file)
  - s presents DCE credentials (sent in RPC)
  - S ACL manager checks user identity and groups against permissions in Access Control Lists

## How Does PKI Authorization Work?



- n User logs in to application server
  - user enters password, unlocks private key
  - signs message (including timestamp and nonce) with private key and transmits to application server
  - s may sent PK certificate along in login message
  - s application server decrypts msg with user's public key

## How Does PKI Authorization Work?



- n User accesses an object (e.g., web page)
  - s application server looks up authorization certificate (signed by authorizing agent) via LDAP server
  - S ACL manager checks user identity and groups against permissions in Access Control Lists